A Decade of European Civil Protection Expenditure and Strategic Fleet Modernization (2015–2025)

The Fiscal Architecture of the Climate Crisis
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The decade spanning from 2015 to 2025 represents a definitive inflection point in the fiscal history of the European Union’s civil protection mechanisms. This period, characterized by the aggressive acceleration of climate-induced extreme weather events, has necessitated a fundamental restructuring of how Member States and the supranational bodies of the Union finance, organize, and deploy firefighting resources. The era of localized, reactive suppression funded primarily through municipal or regional operating budgets has largely ceded ground to a new paradigm: one of high-capital modernization, cross-border reserves, and the integration of civil defense spending into the macro-fiscal frameworks of national recovery and resilience.

The analysis indicates that while the statistical share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocated to "fire protection services" has displayed a deceptive rigidity, hovering between 0.4% and 0.5% at the aggregate EU level, the absolute capital mobilization has been profound. The operationalization of the rescEU strategic reserve, the revitalization of the amphibious aircraft industrial base in North America, and the deployment of NextGenerationEU funds have injected billions of euros into a sector that had suffered from chronic underinvestment in the post-2008 austerity era.

Macro-Financial Trends in European Fire Protection (2015–2023)

To understand the scale of the financial commitment, one must first interrogate the official statistical record provided by Eurostat under the COFOG division 03.2, "Fire protection services." This category encompasses the broad spectrum of government activities: the administration of fire prevention, the operation of regular and auxiliary fire brigades, and the logistical support for civil protection operations.   

Between 2015 and 2023, the fiscal behavior of EU Member States regarding fire protection demonstrated a high degree of statistical stability relative to GDP, even as the operational reality on the ground deteriorated. In 2023, general government total expenditure on public order and safety stood at 1.7% of GDP across the EU. Within this broader envelope, fire protection services accounted for 0.2% of GDP on average. While this percentage appears marginal in the context of total government spending (which hovered around 49% of GDP in 2023), in absolute terms, it represents a substantial and growing financial commitment.   

In 2023, EU governments spent a record €40.6 billion on fire protection services. This figure reflects a significant year-on-year expansion, rising 8.5% from the €37.4 billion recorded in 2022. When viewed over the longer term, the trajectory is one of consistent nominal growth. In 2015, expenditure in the Euro area (19 countries) stood at approximately €32.5 billion. By 2023, this had surged to nearly €35 billion for the same subset of countries, and over €40 billion for the EU-27.   

However, the data reveals a critical insight: fire protection spending is merely keeping pace with inflation and broader economic expansion rather than capturing a significantly larger slice of the public purse. The share of total government expenditure dedicated to fire protection has remained stubbornly flat at 0.5% since 2017. This suggests that despite the exponential increase in wildfire risk, manifested in the "mega-fires" of Portugal (2017), Greece (2018, 2021, 2023), and France (2022), European finance ministries have largely funded the response through general budget growth rather than a radical reprioritization of fiscal resources away from other sectors.   

High-Risk vs. Low-Risk Allocations

The expenditure landscape is deeply fractured, reflecting the diverse climatic zones, forest cover densities, and organizational models (professional vs. volunteer) employed by different Member States.

The High-Expenditure Tier: 
Romania consistently emerges as the statistical outlier in terms of relative priority. In 2023, Romania allocated 0.9% of its total government expenditure to fire protection services, the highest share in the Union. This was followed by Estonia and Greece, both allocating 0.7%, and Bulgaria and Lithuania at 0.6%.   

The case of Greece is particularly instructive of the fiscal pressures imposed by climate change. Despite severe fiscal constraints during the previous decade of adjustment programs, Greece maintained a high level of spending relative to GDP (0.3% in 2023), comparable to much wealthier nations like Germany and France. In absolute terms, Greek expenditure on fire protection rose to €769 million in 2023, a marked increase from €697 million in previous reporting periods. This reflects the existential nature of the threat to the Greek economy and society, forcing the state to maintain high spending levels even amidst broader austerity.   

The Low-Expenditure Tier: 
Denmark reported the lowest share of expenditure at just 0.1% of total government spending in 2023. This is consistent with a long-term trend. Denmark actually decreased its spending on fire protection by 17% over the decade ending in 2021. This divergence highlights the "fire divide" in Europe, where northern states have historically viewed fire protection as a minor municipal competency, although this is rapidly changing as fire belts move northward to Sweden and Germany.   

The Paradox of Portugal: 
Despite being ground zero for some of Europe's most catastrophic wildfires, it reported a relatively low share of expenditure at 0.3% of total government spending in 2023. This low figure is deceptive and illustrates the limitations of COFOG data. Portugal relies heavily on a volunteer firefighting model ("Bombeiros Voluntários"), whose costs are structurally different from the professional corps of France or Germany. Following the 2017 tragedies, Portugal shifted massive amounts of funding into prevention programs managed under agricultural or environmental budget lines (COFOG 05 or 04), which are not captured in the "fire protection" (03.2) statistics. As detailed later in this report, Portugal increased its prevention spending from 20% to 61% of total fire-related funds between 2017 and 2022.  

The Wage Bill Dilemma

A defining characteristic of fire protection expenditure is the overwhelming dominance of personnel costs. At the EU level, "compensation of employees" accounted for 69% of total expenditure in the broad "public order and safety" division in 2023. This labor-intensive cost structure makes the sector highly sensitive to wage inflation and limits the fiscal headroom available for capital investment (Capex) in new technologies or fleets.   

In 2024, the EU employed approximately 390,600 professional firefighters, representing 0.19% of total EU employment. This workforce grew by 28,200 compared to 2023, a significant expansion that reflects a pan-European recruitment drive. The distribution of this workforce mirrors the expenditure data:   

• Croatia holds the highest share of firefighters in total employment (0.45%).

• Greece follows with 0.41%.

• Czechia stands at 0.34%.

• The Netherlands (0.07%) and Denmark (0.08%) have the lowest densities.   

The demographic profile of this workforce poses a future fiscal risk. While currently younger than the general workforce, 75.2% of professional firefighters were aged between 15 and 49 in 2024, compared to 64.8% for the total workforce, the physical demands of the job necessitate early retirement schemes, which create long-term pension liabilities that are often off-balance-sheet in the immediate departmental budgets.   

Source: Derived from Eurostat datasets. SRC1, SRC2, SRC3. Note: (p) denotes provisional data. 

The rescEU Strategic Reserve and Fleet Renewal

While operational budgets cover wages and fuel, the most significant strategic financial development of the 2015-2025 period has been the capitalization of the European aerial firefighting fleet. This shift was triggered by the systemic failures of the 2017-2018 fire seasons, where simultaneous blazes across the continent exhausted the voluntary "European Civil Protection Pool," leaving nations without recourse.

The Financial Architecture of rescEU (2021–2027)

In response to these capability gaps, the European Commission established rescEU in 2019, a reserve of assets fully funded by the EU but hosted by Member States. This marked a transition from a coordination role to a direct financing role. Under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was allocated a total budget of €3.3 billion.   

Crucially, €2.056 billion of this amount was derived from the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument. This classification of civil protection assets as "recovery" spending allowed for a massive front-loading of investment, treating wildfire resilience as a core component of Europe's post-pandemic economic reconstruction. This funding stream is distinct from the standard MFF allocations and comes with strict timelines for commitment and disbursement, driving a rapid procurement cycle between 2021 and 2026

 The €600 Million DHC-515 Procurement

The flagship project of this new financial era is the acquisition of a permanent fleet of medium amphibious aircraft. In March 2024, the European Commission announced the allocation of €600 million to finance the purchase of 12 new De Havilland DHC-515 firefighting planes.   

This procurement represents a complex intersection of fiscal policy, diplomacy, and industrial strategy:

1. 100% EU Financing: 
   The acquisition costs for these 12 aircraft are fully covered by the EU budget. This is a departure from the co-financing models often used in structural funds, reflecting the recognition of these planes as "European common goods".   
   
   

2. The "Hosting" Model: 
   The aircraft will be legally owned by the hosting Member States, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but remain contractually bound to the rescEU mechanism. The hosting nations are responsible for the staffing and maintenance, often supported by further EU operational grants.   
   
   

3. Industrial Resurrection: 
   The order was the conditio sine qua non for the manufacturer, De Havilland Canada, to restart the production line for the aircraft (formerly the Bombardier CL-415), which had been dormant since 2015. The high unit cost, approximately €50 million per aircraft based on the Croatian contract, reflects the amortization of the non-recurring engineering costs required to modernize the airframe and reboot the supply chain.   

The Capability Gap and Transitional Measures

The industrial reality of aerospace manufacturing dictates that money spent today does not equal planes on the tarmac tomorrow. The first DHC-515s are not expected to be delivered until 2027, with the full fleet operational closer to 2030.   

To bridge this dangerous capability gap (2024-2027), the EU has had to finance a parallel "transitional fleet." For the 2024 wildfire season alone, the EU funded a standby fleet of 28 airplanes and 4 helicopters stationed across 10 Member States. This creates a double financial burden: the capital payments for the future fleet and the operational lease payments for the interim fleet. For instance, Sweden received specific EU grants to host two Air Tractor AT-802F "Fireboss" aircraft for the 2024-2025 period to ensure coverage in Northern Europe while the permanent fleet is built.

National Expenditure Strategies

While the EU provides the strategic layer, the bulk of the financial heavy lifting remains at the national level. The following analysis dissects the specific budgetary strategies of key Member States, revealing how local politics and geography shape spending.

The "Aigis" Program and the Capital Surge

Greece represents the most extreme example of capital intensification in the EU. Following the trauma of the Mati fire (2018) and the catastrophic summer of 2021, the Greek government launched the "Aigis" program, managed by the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection.

• Total Volume: 
  The program commands a massive budget of €1.76 billion (or up to €2.1 billion in some aggregations), financed largely through the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).
  
  

• The DHC-515 Order: 
  Greece has placed the largest single order for the new De Havilland aircraft: seven units. Five are funded through the national budget (via EIB loans) and two are fully funded by rescEU. The parliament approved a specific contract value of €361 million for these aircraft, including support and spare parts.
  
  

• Operational Spending: 
  Beyond capital goods, operational spending has surged. In 2021, the Civil Protection budget received a 56% boost, and the seasonal firefighting force was expanded by 3,000 personnel.
  
  

• The Prevention Imbalance: 
  Critics point to a severe misalignment in Greek spending. While billions are allocated to high-tech suppression assets ("Aigis"), funding for forestry services remains anemic. In 2021, only €1.4 million was allocated to the forestry service for nationwide prevention works, a figure dwarfed by the cost of a single hour of flight time for the aerial fleet. This imbalance suggests a political preference for visible, media-friendly assets (planes) over invisible, labor-intensive prevention (clearing scrub).   

Budgetary Constraints and the "Pactes Capacitaires" in France

France, with its highly professionalized civil defense model, faces a different challenge: maintaining a sophisticated but aging system amidst fiscal consolidation. The relevant budget line is "Programme 161 - Sécurité civile" within the "Mission Sécurités."

• Budget 2025 Contraction: 
  The draft budget for 2025 allocates €831.4 million to Programme 161, a decrease of 5.6% compared to the 2024 budget of €880.5 million. This reduction has alarmed legislators, particularly given the cancellation of a delivery of two Canadairs initially planned for the short term.
  
  

• Fleet Diversification (Dash 8 Q400MR): 
  To reduce reliance on the out-of-production Canadairs, France invested heavily in the Dash 8 Q400MR. Between 2017 and 2023, France acquired and integrated six of these multi-role aircraft. While the acquisition cost is high (approx. €65-75 million per unit with support), the operational costs are also significant: the maintenance of a Dash 8 represents 67% of its hourly flight cost of €7,392.
    

• Decentralized Investment (Pactes Capacitaires): 
  Recognizing that the 99 Departmental Fire and Rescue Services (SDIS) bear the brunt of operations, the state introduced "Pactes Capacitaires" to co-finance equipment. In 2023, the state committed €150 million to aid SDIS in purchasing over 1,100 vehicles. For example, the SDIS of Vendée signed a pact to acquire 10 forest fire tankers and 4 command vehicles, with deliveries scheduled through 2025.
  
  

• Technological Modernization: 
  A major cost driver is the NexSIS 18-112 project, a unified digital emergency management system. Its total cost was re-evaluated in 2024 to €300 million, up from the initial €237 million, reflecting the difficulties of digital transformation in the public sector. 

The Tension Between Central and Regional Purses in Spain

Spain's decentralized model means the "real" budget is the sum of the central Ministry for Ecological Transition (MITECO) and the 17 Autonomous Communities.

• Central Modernization: 
  The central government approved a €375 million program to modernize the 43rd Air Force Group (the unit operating the Canadairs) and acquire seven new DHC-515s. This is a strategic capital injection intended to secure the state's reserve capability for the next 30 years.   
  
  

• MITECO Operational Budget: 
  For the 2025 campaign, MITECO mobilized €115.8 million for aerial and brigade support. Additionally, in September 2025, it released an emergency tranche of €34.5 million specifically for post-fire restoration.
  
  

• The Regional Leviathans: 
  The regional budgets often dwarf the state's operational spend.

  • Andalusia: The "Plan INFOCA" budget for 2025 is €257 million (146m for prevention, 111m for extinction).   
    
    

  • Castilla y León: Following severe criticism for past underfunding, the region claims to have tripled its prevention investment to €74 million in 2025.   
    
    

  • Galicia: The "Pladiga" plan allocates €200 million for 2025.   
    
    

  • Catalonia: Expenditures exceed €327 million across prevention and suppression departments. When aggregated, Spanish public spending on wildfire management likely exceeds €2 billion annually, significantly higher than what central government statistics alone would suggest.

Note: Regional figures often include personnel costs not fully comparable between regions due to different accounting of forestry staff.

The PNRR Green Transition in Italy

Italy finances its system through the Ministry of the Interior (Vigili del Fuoco) and outsources its heavy aerial fleet.

Italy operates the world's largest Canadair fleet (18 aircraft) but does not fly them with state pilots. In 2024, Avincis won a seven-year contract to operate and maintain this fleet. This creates a rigid operational expenditure (Opex) line item that is legally binding and indexed to inflation, unlike capital budgets which can be deferred.   

Italy has utilized its massive share of the EU Recovery Fund to "green" the fire service. Under "Mission 2, Component 2," the government allocated funds to purchase 3,570 electric vehicles and 300 biomethane-powered heavy trucks. As of mid-2024, over 2,000 of these vehicles had been delivered, representing a specific investment in decarbonizing the emergency services themselves.   

The budget law for 2025 (Legge di Bilancio) navigates a tight fiscal path, with specific allocations for contract renewals (€32 million for accessory treatments) but broader cuts to ministry overheads.

The Pivot to Prevention in Portugal

Portugal offers the most distinct counter-narrative in Europe. After the trauma of 2017, where fires killed over 100 people, the state fundamentally re-engineered its budget.

Between 2017 and 2022, the percentage of total fire-related public funds spent on prevention rose from 20% to 61%. This is a unique achievement in the EU context, where suppression usually dominates.   

The "MAIS Floresta" program, funded by the Recovery and Resilience Plan (PRR), channels hundreds of millions into landscape transformation. Investment RE-C08-i05 specifically targets the reinforcement of operational capacity in forestry zones.   

In 2024, the government announced a €52 million package including €30 million for tractors and fuel management machinery for municipalities and producer organizations. This moves spending away from "fire engines" and towards "farming engines," reflecting a doctrine that fires are fought in winter through land management, not just in summer with water.

The European Court of Auditors Report (2025)

In 2025, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) released Special Report 16/2025, titled "EU funding to tackle forest fires. More preventive measures, but insufficient evidence of results and their long-term sustainability". This audit provides a critical "sanity check" on the billions being spent.

The "Black Hole" of Data

The ECA found that the European Commission lacks a comprehensive overview of how much money is actually spent on fire prevention. Member States often lump fire spending into general "disaster resilience" or "forestry management" pots within the Cohesion Policy funds, making it impossible to track the exact euro-for-hectare efficiency. The audit identified approximately €1 billion in Cohesion funding and €1.5 billion in RRF funding allocated to fire-related projects in just four states (Greece, Spain, Poland, Portugal) between 2014 and 2026, but the specific outcomes of this spending remain opaque. 

The Sustainability Trap

A damning finding of the audit is the lack of sustainability for RRF-funded prevention. The RRF is a temporary, one-off instrument expiring in 2026. The ECA noted that while RRF funds paid for massive vegetation clearance and firebreak construction (e.g., €470 million in Greece, €390 million in Portugal), there are often no guaranteed national budget lines to maintain these firebreaks after 2026. Without annual maintenance (recurring Opex), a firebreak becomes overgrown and useless within 3-4 years. Thus, the report warns that billions in "investment" might effectively be wasted if national budgets do not permanently expand to absorb the maintenance costs.

Outdated Intelligence

The audit also revealed that spending decisions are often based on obsolete data. In Greece, funds were allocated based on fire risk maps that were 45 years old. In Portugal, funding was allocated to a region that was partially underwater due to a new dam construction, simply because the hazard maps had not been updated to reflect the new reservoir. This suggests that while the volume of spending has increased, the intelligence guiding that spending has lagged behind. 

Emerging Markets: The Northern Expansion

The changing climate has forced the "fire belt" northward, compelling nations with little history of large wildfires to enter the market.

• Germany: 

• While historically a low-risk country, Germany's sheer size makes it a massive spender in absolute terms. In 2023, provisional data indicates Germany spent €12.8 billion on fire protection services (mostly municipal fire brigades). This figure is primarily driven by the high density of volunteer infrastructure and equipment standards, but federal investments in aerial capabilities are increasing.   
  
  

• Sweden: 
  Following the 2018 fires, Sweden became a host nation for rescEU assets. It utilized EU grants to host two Air Tractor AT-802F aircraft for the 2024-2025 period. This represents a new, permanent line item in the Swedish civil defense budget: aerial forest firefighting.   
  
  

• Croatia: 
  A smaller economy, Croatia is punching above its weight by hosting a rescEU hub. Its purchase of two DHC-515s for €105 million (EU funded) represents a massive capability leap, increasing its fleet from six to eight heavy bombers.

As Europe moves toward 2030, the question is no longer if Member States will spend more on firefighting, but how they will sustain the expanded apparatus they have built.